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Abstract:  The use of GPS surveillance technology for prolonged automated 
surveillance of American citizens is proliferating, and a direct split between the 
Ninth and D.C. Circuits on whether warrants are required under the Fourth 
Amendment for such use of GPS technology is bringing the issue to a head in the 
Supreme Court.  A Petition for Certiorari is pending in the Ninth Circuit case which 
held that warrants are not required, and a second Petition is likely from the 
Government in the D.C. Circuit case holding that warrants are required.  In this 
paper, we argue first, that where a technology enables invasion of interests at the 
heart of the Fourth Amendment’s concern -- protection of citizens from arbitrary 
government intrusions into their private lives -- the Court’s precedents require 
warrants to prevent abuse, and second, that the type and scope of information 
collected by prolonged automated GPS surveillance enables governments to monitor 
a person’s political associations, their medical conditions and their amorous 
interests, in a way that invades their privacy and chills expression of other 
fundamental rights.   
Our argument differs significantly from previous scholarship by tracing a 
continuous emphasis in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on review of the 
potential for abuse of surveillance methods.  Moreover, we are the first to argue that 
in protecting against abuse the Court has drawn a firm line between technology 
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that simply enhances the natural senses of law enforcement officials, and 
technology that creates novel, non-biological “senses.”   
In Part I of this paper, we trace the origins of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections against law enforcement abuse, present evidence that GPS surveillance 
technology is in fact being abused, and discuss the impact unfettered abuse of the 
technology will have on the individual rights of citizens.  In Part II, we explain the 
Court’s historic approach to new surveillance technologies, noting that the Court 
has carefully examined new technologies to prevent any end-runs around legal 
doctrine from eroding personal privacy, and showing that the Court has always 
required warrants where technology goes beyond enhancement of senses to the 
creation of new non-biological “senses.”  In Part III, we explain why the Supreme 
Court’s ruling on the use of beeper technology to enhance visual surveillance in 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), does not apply to the use of GPS 
technology as a replacement for visual surveillance.  Finally, in Part IV, we explain 
how prolonged automated GPS surveillance invades a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and chills the exercise of core constitutional rights. 
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When used properly, advanced surveillance technologies significantly enhance 
the ability of law enforcement to maintain order and public safety. However, in an 
era of rapidly advancing technologies, from thermal imagers to minuscule 
automated tracking devices, it is critical to ensure that these technologies, 
especially given their advanced capabilities, are only used “in a manner which will 
conserve … the interests and rights of individual citizens,” Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and preserve core Fourth 
Amendment values.  Although the United States Supreme Court has held that in 
most cases, “requiring a warrant will have the salutary effect of ensuring that use of 
[new technology] is not abused,” see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984), 
federal and many State law enforcement officials throughout the nation are 
currently using Global Positioning System (“GPS”) surveillance technology for 
prolonged, automated, remote surveillance without obtaining warrants.   
As a result, cases are proliferating in which law enforcement’s warrantless uses 
of GPS surveillance technology are being challenged by defendants, and courts are 
looking for direction from the Supreme Court.  Most recently, a split has emerged 
between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits on the issue.  In United States v. Pineda-
Moreno,2 the Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-94 
(1983) -- which approved limited use of relatively primitive beeper technology -- to 
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uphold warrantless use of the vastly more complex GPS surveillance technology.3  
On the other hand, in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
reh’g en banc denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C. Circuit pointed to the 
vast differences between the limited use of beepers to enhance visual surveillance 
almost thirty years ago in Knotts and the unprecedented power of GPS surveillance 
technology used today and held that warrants are required.4 
State courts are similarly divided.  On the one hand, high courts in three states -
- Washington, New York, and Massachusetts -- held that warrants are required for 
use of GPS under the state’s constitution, and the Supreme Court of Oregon held 
that warrants are even required for the use of beepers, a far less powerful electronic 
monitoring device.5  On the other hand, three state intermediate appellate courts -- 
in Virginia, Wisconsin and Maryland – have held that a warrant is not required for 
                                                        
3 The Seventh Circuit has suggested in dicta that a warrant may not be required for the use of GPS.  
See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).  However, the appellant in that case 
had not challenged the use of GPS to track his car on public streets, but only the installation of the 
GPS device itself, and even the dicta is based on the court’s belief that GPS was not being used in 
“routine criminal enforcement,” but only when the police “have a suspect in their sights,” and an 
appropriate level of suspicion.  Id.; see also Maynard,615 F.3d at 557 (discussing Garcia and citing 
Br. of Appellant at 22 (No. 06-2741)).  Moreover, in Garcia Judge Posner warned “Technological 
progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would 
have been prohibitively expensive,” and expressed with relief that “Whether and what kind of 
restrictions should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance when used in 
routine criminal enforcement are momentous issues that fortunately we need not try to resolve in 
this case.”    
4 See also Chief Judge Kozinski’s powerful dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
5 See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201-03 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that state constitution 
requires a warrant for the use of GPS for prolonged law enforcement surveillance, and that issue was 
unresolved under Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 
N.E.2d 356, 366 (Mass. 2009) (same); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 264 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) 
(citizens of this State have a right [under the Washington State Constitution] to be free from the 
type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a citizen's vehicle); see 
also State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988) (use of radio transmitter was search requiring 





use of GPS.6  The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that a warrant is not required 
for the use of the less-intrusive beeper technology when used as an aid to visual 
surveillance, but has not yet addressed the use of GPS for prolonged automated 
surveillance.7 
In this paper, we argue that prolonged surveillance using GPS technology should 
be subject to the warrant requirement under current Supreme Court precedent for 
two reasons.8  First, because surveillance with GPS is conducted not by people but 
by minuscule, advanced tracking devices communicating with satellites in orbit, the 
potential for law enforcement abuse of GPS technology to conduct automated and 
prolonged surveillance both against individuals as well as groups of individuals is 
unprecedented.  Evidence exists that such abuse is occurring.  Where a technology 
enables invasion of interests at the heart of the Fourth Amendment’s concern -- 
protection of citizens from arbitrary government intrusions into their private lives -- 
the Court’s precedents require warrants to prevent abuse.   
                                                        
6   See Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 290 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (holding no warrant required 
for use of GPS “for at most six days”); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (no 
warrant required for use of GPS for law enforcement surveillance under U.S. Constitution); Stone v. 
State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (holding that “appellant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location . . . in a vehicle riding on public roads, and therefore 
evidence about the use of the GPS device  . . . was not relevant to the appellant's Fourth 
Amendment-based suppression motion.”). 
7 Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 525-26 (Nev. 2002) (en banc) (holding only that no warrant was 
required for use of a beeper as an aid to visual surveillance under Nevada Constitution) 
8 Another commentator has argued that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would need to be 
modified to take the potential for abuse of surveillance techniques into account.  See Brian J. Serr, 
Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 





Second, we argue that prolonged surveillance using GPS technology provides the 
government with detailed information about an individual’s movements and 
gathering places and allows the storage, analysis, and comparison of that data with 
data gathered from others, all with minimal involvement of law enforcement 
officers.  The type and scope of information collected by GPS surveillance enables 
governments to monitor a person’s political associations, their medical conditions, 
and their amorous interests, in a way that invades their privacy and chills 
expression of other fundamental rights.  See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958) (forced disclosure of names of members of NAACP violated right to freedom 
of association protected by federal Constitution).  It allows surveillance of citizens 
on a scale that this country has never seen.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 
F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (making comparison to surveillance under a totalitarian regime).   
In Part I of this paper, we trace the origins of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections against law enforcement abuse, present evidence that GPS surveillance 
technology is in fact being abused, and discuss the impact unfettered abuse of the 
technology will have on the individual rights of citizens.  In Part II, we explain the 
Court’s historic approach to new surveillance technologies, noting that the Court 
has carefully examined new technologies to prevent any end-runs around legal 
doctrine from eroding personal privacy.  Furthermore, the Court has drawn a firm 





officials, and technology that creates novel, non-biological “senses,”  requiring 
warrants for the latter.  In Part III, we explain why the Supreme Court’s ruling on 
the use of beeper technology to enhance visual surveillance in Knotts does not apply 
to the use of GPS technology as a replacement for visual surveillance.  Finally, in 
Part IV, we explain how prolonged automated GPS surveillance invades a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and will chill the exercise of core constitutional 
rights.  We conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should clarify that while 
law enforcement may employ advanced GPS tracking devices in their efforts to 
enhance public safety, use of this technology for prolonged, automated, remote 
surveillance is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections of a warrant issued 
by a neutral arbiter on probable cause. 
I. Fundamental Principles of The Fourth Amendment Require 
Application of the Warrant Requirement to Prevent Abuse of GPS 
Surveillance Technology. 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides our primary protection against “a too 
permeating police surveillance” and abuse of police authority, United States v. Di 
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948), and “gives concrete expression to a right of the people 
which ‘is basic to a free society.’”  Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).  See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 
33-34 (1927).  In response to “indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under 
the authority of ‘general warrants,’” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 & n. 21 





security of individuals” against such “arbitrary invasions.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 
(1967) (citations omitted).   
By placing a check on abuses of power, the Fourth Amendment also reflects a 
“deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of 
unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a 
real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.”  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).  The Founders recognized that certain individuals are 
more at risk than others when they gather to discuss politics or transact business.  
To limit “discretion” and protect against police abuse, the Fourth Amendment 
requires that “the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence” be 
drawn “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Payton, 445 U.S. 
at 621 n.24.  Without a warrant requirement, GPS technology increases 
exponentially the potential for surveillance abuse.9   
There is a vast technical valley between the primitive beeper technology that the 
Court considered almost thirty years ago, and the advanced, automated GPS 
surveillance technology in use today.  The beeper devices were simple tools that 
were approved for use without a warrant only when they provided modest sense-
enhancement to real-time visual surveillance conducted by law enforcement officers.  
As described in Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, “[a] beeper is a radio transmitter, usually 
                                                        
9 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (warning that 





battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio 
receiver.”  After receiving the signal, whose strength indicates whether the object to 
which the beeper is attached is approaching or moving away, police officers in the 
vicinity could use this information to respond accordingly.  Id.  Beepers could 
neither determine location themselves nor store that data.  Pineda-Moreno, 617 
F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“If no one was close enough to pick up the 
signal, [the data] was lost forever.”). 
In contrast, modern GPS surveillance technology is a satellite-based service 
generally consisting of: 1) a GPS receiver (the “tracking device”), generally 
minuscule and inexpensive, that autonomously calculates latitude, longitude, 
altitude, direction and speed by receiving and processing location information from 
the transmissions of at least four GPS satellites in nearby orbit; 2) a wireless 
transmitter attached to the receiver which sends the calculated location information 
to a specified remote destination; and 3) a law enforcement computer that records 
the transmitted tracking data, stores it for an unlimited amount of time, and can 
analyze and compare it with data collected from other targets.10,11  The first item 
comprises the “core” location-determining technology used in GPS surveillance; the 
second and third items are technologies to collect and process that location 
information for law enforcement use.  Alternate methods of retrieving this 
                                                        
10 See Tied Up, 55 UCLA L. Rev. at 415. 
11 See U.S. Department of Defense, Global Positioning System Standard Positioning Service 
Performance Standard 4th ed. at v (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.pnt.gov/public/docs/2008/spsps2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011); see also GPS.gov 





information exist, such as the use of digital storage onboard the GPS device to store 
the information and the subsequent retrieval of that information by manually 
accessing the device or via short-duration or “burst” wireless transmissions which 
can be triggered on-demand when an officer is within range to receive them.  Thus, 
the requirement that law enforcement officers actively maintain proximity to the 
surveillance device – a notable limitation of “beeper” and other similar transponder-
based location systems – is not present when using GPS surveillance. 
GPS, unlike the beepers of yore, does not enhance human senses; it replaces 
them with something different in kind and capacity, allowing remote, automated 
collection of data about a target’s location, movements, speed of movement, and 
even altitude.  With GPS, time can be figured to within a millionth of a second, 
velocity within a fraction of a mile per hour, and location to within 1-2 meters of 
horizontal accuracy and 5 meters of vertical accuracy.12 Efforts are underway to 
further improve accuracy to within 10-15 centimeters.13 
Evidence is growing that the increasing availability of GPS surveillance 
                                                        
12 See Report to Congress: Recapitalization Plan for the NDGPS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION (June 2010), available at ; U.S. Air Force, Global Positioning System, available at  
(describing system available in 92% of the contiguous U.S.); Jim Arnold, High Accuracy Nationwide 
Differential Global Positioning System (HA-NDGPS) Update (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/cgsicmeetings/49/Reports/%5B38%5DHA_NDGPS.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011); Gary Pruitt, ARINC Incorporated, NDGPS Assessment:  Final Report (March 2008), 
available at http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/ndgps/ndgps%20assessment%20report_final.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2011); U.S. Department of Defense, Global Positioning System Standard Positioning 
Service Performance Standard 4th ed. (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.pnt.gov/public/docs/2008/spsps2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) at v; see also test data 
available from the U.S. Dep’t of Transportation’s Wide Area Augmentation System, 
http://www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/. 
13 See GPS.gov Augmentation Systems, available at http://www.gps.gov/systems/ augmentations/ (last 





technology has led to abuse of law enforcement’s power to monitor Americans to 
prevent and investigate criminal activity.  The precise scope of GPS surveillance is 
unknown; there are no nationwide statistics available on the frequency of GPS 
surveillance and most police departments resist disclosing how often they use it.  
However, the FBI provides special training to its officers in the use of GPS14 and 
some local jurisdictions have willingly reported the scope of their use.15  For 
example, one police department, in Fairfax, Virginia, reports using GPS 
surveillance 61 times in 2005 alone.16  A spokesperson for the National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers reports that GPS surveillance has been used “in cases 
from New York City to small towns – whoever can afford to get the equipment and 
plant it on a car.”17 
In one recent incident, a twenty-year-old college student from Santa Clara, 
California, Yasir Afifi, discovered a GPS surveillance device affixed to his car.  Afifi 
is an American citizen whose father, also an American citizen, was a former 
president of a Muslim Community Association in San Francisco before he moved to 
Egypt in 2003.  Forty-eight hours after Afifi removed the device and asked for help 
online to identify it, he received a visit from several FBI agents who demanded the 
                                                        
14 Keith Hodges, Tracking Bad Guys: Legal Considerations in Using GPS, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Law Enforcement Bulletin (July 2007), available at 
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/articles/FBI-LE-
Bulletin-GPS-Tracking-Jul2007.pdf/view?searchterm=GPS (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
15 Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, Washington Post (Aug.13, 2008), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
16 Id.; see also Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 284 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). 





return of the device.  Afifi was then questioned about an online blog maintained by 
his close friend.  To date, he has not been charged with a crime.  The FBI, after 
reclaiming the tracking device, has provided no further details.18 
Our freedom has depended in part on the government’s inability to continually 
follow all, or even large groups, of us at any time for any reason.  Because resources 
are limited, we know that the police cannot assign an officer to track each of us 
around the clock.  Now, though, because the GPS satellite system can support an 
effectively unlimited number of tracking devices, and because GPS surveillance 
technology is inexpensive and allows automated tracking, neither cost nor 
limitations on human resources imposes an impediment to pervasive surveillance of 
the populace.19   
As the Court has recognized, the only other effective limitation on abuse of 
surveillance tactics is the warrant requirement.20  Without warrants, the police 
could track each and every one of us, or perhaps some large group of us, all 
Republicans, all Democrats, all Tea Party members, all those with Muslim 
surnames, for an unlimited amount of time, discovering our political beliefs, our 
medical maladies, and any other affairs we wished to keep to ourselves.  This “too 
                                                        
18 Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/all/1 last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
19 GPS surveillance technology “can provide law enforcement with a swift, efficient, silent, invisible 
and cheap way of tracking the movements of virtually anyone and everyone they choose.”  Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  
20 Enforcement depends upon the exclusionary rule as “neither administrative, criminal nor civil 
remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.”  Elkins v. United States, 364 





permeating police surveillance,” see Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595, would serve as a crime 
deterrent; but it would also have a devastating effect, chilling free speech and 
association21 and the expression of other desires essential to dignity and the pursuit 
of happiness.22 
Used without a warrant requirement, GPS, like wiretaps, thermal imaging, and 
beepers used for more than sense-enhancement, “shrink[s] the realm of personal 
privacy,” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, beyond the dreams or nightmares of the Founders.  
Warrants would ensure that this powerful technology is not abused.  See Karo, 468 
U.S. at 717 (warrants prevent abuse of technology). 
II.  Historically, The Court Has Prevented New Surveillance 
Technologies From Encroaching Fundamental Constitutional 
Values. 
 
Because new technologies can create powers of surveillance that were not 
anticipated when old legal standards were developed, the Court evaluates them to 
“assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.23  The Court 
rejects “mechanical” application of standards that allow end-runs around Fourth 
Amendment protections, leaving us “at the mercy of advancing technology.”  See id. 
                                                        
21 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
22 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“‘intimate and personal choices . . . [are] central 
to personal dignity”) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
23 Means of surveillance, not only results, determine whether a form of investigation or inquiry is 
acceptable.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. 37-39; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Fourth 
Amendment limits not only “the type of information the State may gather,” but also “the means it 
may use to gather it.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“overriding function of the 






at 36.  Instead, the Court encourages adoption of rules that “take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” Id. at 37.  As the 
Court cautioned more than eighty years ago: 
the assurance against any revival of [police abuse], so carefully 
embodied in the fundamental [Fourth Amendment] law, is not to be 
impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which, regarded 
superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but which, 
in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right. 
Byars, 273 U.S. at 33-34.   
Accordingly, the Court’s decisions examine whether allowing a new surveillance 
method to be used unfettered by the modest limitations of the warrant requirement, 
and therefore subject to officer “discretion” and abuse, will diminish privacy in ways 
antithetical to the aims of a free society.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-36. See also NAACP, 
357 U.S. at 462 (recognizing vital connection between constitutional rights to 
privacy and freedom of association).  The Court has not hesitated to modify its 
Fourth Amendment inquiry as necessary to ensure the original meaning of the 
Amendment is carried forward.  
For example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court evaluated 
law enforcement’s use of listening devices allowing them to eavesdrop on a target’s 
phone conversations even when attached to the outside of phone booths.  The 
officers could listen to the conversation as if the device was inside the room, all 
while meeting the technical requirements of Fourth Amendment doctrine that at 





United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  The Court modified the doctrine to fit new 
realities, recognizing that the difference between physical and electronic intrusion 
had “no constitutional significance.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  The Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places,” id. at 361, and emphasized that 
notions of privacy and improper intrusion protected by the Fourth Amendment 
cannot be defeated by technological developments allowing end runs around 
previous doctrine.  Id. at 362.24 
In a similar vein, in Schmerber v. California, where the Court faced “intrusions 
into the human body rather than . . . state interferences with property relationships 
or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects',” it “wr[o]te on a clean slate.”  384 
U.S. at 767-68.  Though the Court ultimately approved the search in Schmerber 
under the exigent circumstances exception, this new more intrusive method of 
search garnered additional scrutiny from the Court.  
In addition, while the Court has approved of some primitive “sense-enhancing” 
technologies to aid officers conducting visual surveillance, the Court has placed 
limits on their use.  The Court has never allowed unwarranted use of “sense-
creating” technologies – those that do not enhance human senses but operate 
independently of humans.  Indeed, the Knotts holding is part of a tradition of 
                                                        
24 The protections of the Fourth Amendment go beyond the walls of each man’s “castle.”  See, e.g., 
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365 (1921); Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (Founders also “protect[ed] Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 





allowing the limited use of primitive technologies as sense-enhancements of, not as 
replacements for, visual surveillance; the Court has always required warrants for 
the use of technologies that replace human senses with technological ones.  See 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (thermal imaging); Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 (beepers when used 
as alternative to visual surveillance); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
(wiretapping); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (movie projector). 
For example, in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), the Court 
confirmed that no search took place where officers used “searchlights” or “marine 
glass or field glass” to help them see on the deck of a ship.  See also Dow Chemical 
Co., 476 U.S. at 237-38 (warrantless use of airplane-mounted camera authorized 
because “mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree 
here, does not give rise to constitutional problems”).  In contrast, in Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), the Court held that using a movie projector, fairly basic 
technology even at the time, to view films without a warrant was an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  The projector didn’t just “enhance” sight, it 
created a new capacity.  The police would have been unable to discern the content of 
a film strip, id. at 652 n.2, even with a bright light or a magnifying glass.  The use 
of a technology that gave them the new ability to inspect the strip’s contents 
required warrant authorization.  Id. at 654.  See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.25 
                                                        
25 It is doubtful that a warrant would have been required in Katz if the police had merely listened to 






Knotts, like Lee, is a simple application of the “sense-enhancement” rule.  The 
Court upheld the use of beepers without a warrant where they were being used as 
“sense-augmenting” technology that merely enhanced visual surveillance.26  As the 
Court wrote in referencing the searchlights and marine and field glass at issue in 
Lee, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the 
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them in this case.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282-83  (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
United States v. Karo, decided one year later, makes clear the limitations of the 
Knotts decision.  The Court held that a warrant was required for monitoring and 
downloading beeper data when the beeper was in “a location not open to visual 
surveillance,” and “reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that 
Government . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”  468 U.S. at 
714-15.  Thus, as with the movie projector in Walter, when the beeper does not 
enhance human senses but creates a new sense, a warrant is required.  
In Kyllo, the Court again demonstrated the limitations of the “sense-
enhancement” exception.  The Court recognized that it had “previously reserved 
judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception . . . if 
any, is too much.”  533 U.S. at 33.  The Court held that use of thermal-imaging 
                                                        
26 In Knotts, after obtaining consent, officers placed a beeper within a container to be purchased by 
the suspect. Knotts, 460 U.S at 278. They did so only after visual surveillance indicated suspicion. 
Moreover, officers only used the beeper to maintain contact with the container of chloroform in the 





technology to obtain “any information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion” constituted a search 
“at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”  Id. 
at 34.  While finding the thermal-imaging technology at issue there “relatively 
crude,” the Court in Kyllo advocated adopting a rule that could “take account of 
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”  Id. at 36.  
At some point, the Court warned, technology might not just enhance human senses 
by allowing us to see and hear from farther distances or in the dark, but could 
actually create new superhero-like powers, like X-ray vision, see id. at 36 n.3, or 
perhaps the ability to watch thousands of people using satellites.  If law 
enforcement had at its disposal the ability to use these non-human powers of 
surveillance without any warrant limitation, law enforcement technology would 
“shrink the guaranteed realm of privacy.”  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
The Ninth Circuit erred in viewing the key distinction between Kyllo (warrant 
required) and Knotts (warrant not required) as the fact that the thermal imaging 
technology in Kyllo gathered information that would otherwise have been obtained 
only by “a search unequivocally within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” 
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216, in other words a search of the home.  But if the 
officers had merely discovered evidence by looking into the home from outside the 
house with their bare eyes, or even with eyesight enhanced by binoculars, they 





by a search of the home subject to the warrant requirement, yet that surveillance 
would have been allowable without a warrant, because the technology (binoculars) 
would have been allowable “sense-enhancing” technology.27   
In Kyllo, the Court’s discomfort was with the use of a technology that actually 
went beyond “enhancement” of senses.  The use of a technology capable of obtaining 
images of heat by itself created a new sense, substituting for human senses.  Id. at 
36 n.3.  This is the fundamental distinction between Knotts on the one hand 
(warrant not required) and Kyllo, Katz, Walter, and GPS surveillance technology on 
the other (warrant required). 
III. The Court’s Ruling in Knotts Does Not Apply to the Use of GPS 
Surveillance Technology for Prolonged, Automated Surveillance. 
The Ninth Circuit was wrong to rely on Knotts to support its ruling for three 
reasons.  First, as discussed above, the decision in Knotts was limited to situations 
where beepers were used as a “sense-enhancement” technology.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
282; id. at 283 (noting “limited use” which government made of signals from 
beeper); id. at 284-85 (beeper signal not received or relied on after it indicated that 
container ended journey).  GPS surveillance technology does not involve “sense-
enhancement,” but rather substitution for human senses and therefore should be 
governed by Katz, Kyllo and Walter, not Knotts. 
                                                        
27 The Court rejected as “quite irrelevant” the dissent’s objection that heat emanating from the home 
can sometimes be perceived by observers without the use of technology.  Id. at 35, n. 2 (“The fact that 
equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of 





Second, in Knotts the Court reserved the question presented by GPS surveillance 
technology.  Id. at 283-84; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“the [Knotts] Court specifically reserved the question whether a 
warrant would be required in a case involving ‘twenty-four hour surveillance.’”).28  
As the D.C. Circuit noted:  
Knotts held only that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another,” id. at 281, not that such a 
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
whatsoever, world without end, as the Government would have it.  
 
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557.29  See also Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238 (“[U]sing 
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, 
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”) 
(emphasis added).   
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also erred in claiming that the Court’s concern 
expressed in Knotts and Kyllo about technology allowing twenty-four hour 
surveillance was a concern limited to the potential for “mass” surveillance.”  While 
such a prospect is not to be taken lightly, in reserving the question the Court was 
referring to the defendant’s concern that “twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.”  
                                                        
28 See also Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1125-26 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).   
29 See also People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440-44 (2009) (Knotts involved a “single trip” and Court 
“reserved for another day the question of whether a Fourth Amendment issue would be posed if 
‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possible’ ”); Tied Up, 419 UCLA L. 





Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added); see also Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57.   
On the other hand, there is nothing in the Ninth Circuit’s decision that would 
prevent “mass” surveillance.  Nor do we know whether the surveillance in that case 
was indeed part of a program of “mass” surveillance, not albeit of everyone in the 
United States but of some significant portion of the population.   
IV.  Warrantless Prolonged GPS Surveillance Invades a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy and Will Chill the Exercise of Core 
Constitutional Rights. 
As the Court recognized in Knotts: 
this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth 
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can 
claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of 
privacy’ that has been invaded by government action. [Citations 
omitted].  
 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81.  In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit relied on Knotts to 
hold that the government can use GPS surveillance technology without warrants 
because an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
through public space.  Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17.  But not only is this a 
huge leap from the Court’s more limited holding in Knotts that law enforcement 
may use primitive beeper technology as a sense-enhancement to aid in a search,30 it 
also fails to recognize the intrusiveness of prolonged surveillance by invisible, 
                                                        





automated devices that continuously gather and analyze detailed information about 
a person’s movements for an unlimited period of time.31 
a. GPS surveillance technology is more intrusive than primitive 
beeper technology in constitutionally significant ways. 
Three aspects of GPS surveillance technology distinguish it from “sense-
enhancing” beeper technology in constitutionally significant ways: its automated 
nature, the level of detail obtained, and its ability to store data for long periods and 
to analyze and compare it.  First, once the GPS tracking device is installed, it can 
operate autonomously over a prolonged period, without human involvement, 
independently determining and remotely transmitting positional data.  Unlike the 
beepers of yore, police officers need not trail the device or deploy a network of 
receivers in order to determine location information.  As Chief Judge Kozinski puts 
it:  
Beepers could help police keep vehicles in view when following them, 
or find them when they lost sight of them, but they still required at 
least one officer--and usually many more--to follow the suspect. The 
modern devices used in Pineda-Moreno's case can record the car's 
movements without human intervention.  
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  Since GPS tracking 
devices operate autonomously, no police officer experiences real-time “sense-
enhancement” as is the case with a beeper, telescope or flashlight. 
                                                        
31 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (Fourth Amendment “protects personal privacy and dignity 





Second, GPS tracking devices “know” their own location and can be equipped to 
both store that information locally (on the device itself) and transmit that 
information (either in real-time or in bursts) to remote law enforcement computers.  
This flexibility represents a significant advance in location tracking, allowing 
collection of substantially more data and for prolonged periods. As the government 
recognizes elsewhere, GPS tracking devices are “more intrusive” than beeper-style 
transponders.32  Thus, prolonged surveillance by GPS “reveals types of information 
not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, 
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.”  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; id. at 
560.33   
Third, the electronic storage of gathered location data allows the data to be 
considered alongside data collected from other citizens to discover common patterns 
of behavior among different groups of people, a capability that beepers do not have.  
As Chief Judge Kozinski commented:  
By tracking and recording the movements of millions of individuals the 
government can use computers to detect patterns and develop 
suspicions. It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go 
says much about who we are. … Were Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford 
at that protest outside the White House? 
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1125 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
                                                        
32 See Tracking Bad Guys at 26. 
33 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, No. H-10-998M, 2010 WL 
4286365 at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) (historical cell phone records subject to Fourth Amendment 
under Maynard because records sought “are likely far more intrusive”; they reveal “a continuous 






b. GPS surveillance technology is not in general public use. 
 
GPS surveillance technology is not in general public use, and as a result we do 
still have an expectation that we are not being followed perpetually by an invisible 
computerized eye in the sky.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.  Many Americans are 
comfortable with use of a GPS service to determine their own personal location 
where that service operates subject to their consent and control.34  GPS surveillance 
technology, however, is not accepted by the public.  In fact, Americans become 
uncomfortable with GPS when there is even a slight loss of user-control.35    
For example, despite a strong push by companies encouraging Americans to 
adopt “geosocial” software that would allow users to broadcast their locations to 
selected friends using GPS in their phones, only 4 percent of adult Americans use 
these services.36  Americans are wary of anything that will take away our ability to 
preserve our anonymity in public.  As Chief Judge Kozinski notes, 
                                                        
34  Subscription services such as LoJack and OnStar can access an automobile’s location and even 
transmit this location in case of emergency or theft, but only do so with the consent of the user.  
Contrary to Judge Posner’s assertion in Garcia, Google Earth, the web service providing satellite 
images of the ground, cannot track people or vehicles in real time.  Compare United States v. Garcia, 
474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007), with http://earth.google.com/support/bin/answer.py? 
hl=en&answer=176147 ("[t]he information in Google Earth is . . . not in 'real time'.”). 
35 GPS technology is also used by some private and government employers to ensure job performance 
and service delivery, but this use is limited to the terms of the employment relationship and happens 
only while the employee is on the job using a vehicle owned by the employer.  See e.g., Judy Muller, 
City Monitors Employees With GPS, ABC News, Feb. 21 2004, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129219&page=1 (city governments use GPS tracking systems 
to ensure efficiency and monitor services such as street-sweeping and fixing potholes).  See Nannette 
Green Kaminski and William Tran, The National Workrights Institute, On Your Tracks: GPS 
Tracking in the Workplace at 6, available at http://www.workrights.org/ 
issue_electronic/NWI_GPS_Report.pdf. 
36  4% OF ONLINE AMERICANS USE LOCATION-BASED SERVICES at 2 (PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S INTERNET 






You can preserve your anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by 
traveling at night, through heavy traffic, in crowds, by using a 
circuitous route, disguising your appearance, passing in and out of 
buildings and being careful not to be followed.  
617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).   
In other contexts, the federal government recognizes that members of the 
American public maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in data about their 
movements from place to place throughout the day.  To recruit volunteers whose 
vehicles would be equipped with GPS devices for a federally-funded study to assess 
a new mileage-based tax, study organizers felt it necessary to assure volunteers 
that “[n]o detailed route information regarding your driving will be stored or 
collected,” Privacy of Information, http://www.roaduserstudy.org/faq.aspx#privacy 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2010), and information about mileage would be maintained in 
“highly secure locations” in a separate database on a separate server from their 
personal information. See id. & video available at 
http://www.roaduserstudy.org/howitworks.aspx. (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).37  If we 
did not have a reasonable expectation that such information would be private, 
organizers would not have felt the need to provide these assurances. 
Indeed, any finding that individuals had come to expect that information about 
their every movement is being collected and stored for analysis would mean that a 
fundamental goal of the Founders had been abandoned.  As the Court has 
                                                        
37  See National Evaluation of a Mileage-based Road User Charge, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA PUBLIC 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.roaduserstudy.org/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2010) (describing 





recognized, there is a “vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy 
in one's associations. . . . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”  NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.  
“[W]rits of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny 
and oppression” when compared with the power of GPS surveillance technology.  
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis J., dissenting).   
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s strained, “mechanical application” of Knotts, a case 
concerning sense-enhancing beeper technology, to the surveillance capabilities 
made possible by GPS surveillance technology leaves fundamental interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment unguarded.  Without a warrant requirement to 
guide its use, the potential for abuse of GPS surveillance technology is 
unprecedented and its use will significantly “shrink the realm of personal privacy.”  
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.  It is time for the United States Supreme Court to step in 
and clarify that as with other new technologies that allow machines to do the 
watching, GPS surveillance technology can only be used for prolonged automated 
surveillance on the authority of a warrant issued on probable cause.   
